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1,_Introduction
One of the oldest questions in economics is that of whether the market for labor can be
represented satisfactorily by a standard competitive modeL The importance of this question, which
has implications for macroeconomics as well as labor economics, has stimulated much earlier
research and more than a little controversy. The purpose of this paper is to blend microeconornic
data on wages with industrial data on profits to produce a new test of the competitive market
hypothesis. The results of the study suggest that, contrary to the implications of competitive
theory, US pay determination exhibits elements of rent-sharing.
In a prominent early attack on traditional analysis, Sumner Slichter (1950) argued that a
competitive model fails to explain the empirical evidence that apparently homogenous types of
employee earn significantly different amounts in different industries, His data, drawn from the
US manufacturing sector, showed that wages appeared to be positively correlated with various
measures of the employer's 'ability to pay'.Slichier concluded that this con elation provides
prima fade evidence against a conventional competitive model. Recent researth into this issue by
Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) has
reached the same conclusion using better data than were available in Slichter's time. Equivalent
findings emerge from new work on European labor markets by, for example, Blanchflower era!
(1990), Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990), Carruth and Oswald (1989), Holmlund and Zetterberg
(1991), Denny and Machin (1991), and Nickell and Wadhwani (1990). The Canadian results of
Christofides and Oswald (1992) point to the same conclusion.
Almost all of these studies estimate rnicmeconometric wage equations and examine whether
variables such as profitability enter positively and significantly in those equations. Such results, it
is argued, imply that a competitive version of labor market theory is rejected because, in an
atomistic wage-taking environment, high profits in a firm or industry should not affect the
competitive requirement that employers pay neither more nor less than the going wage in the
external labor market, An employer who offered epsilon above that market rate should --whether2
or not high profits make such a wage feasible --beflooded with job applicants from other sectors.
In a competitive framework, an employer's ability to pay ought to have no effect upon the earnings
of its workers. There ought to be no rent-sharing.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether, in US manufacturing industry,
there is evidence that wages depend upon the employer's ability to pay. It appears to be the first
US study to do so in a way that can connnl for industry fixed effects(l). A second purpose of the
paper is to argue that, conary to what has sometimes been asserted, the existence of some forms
of positive correlation between wages and profitability would not automatically disprove
competitive theory. Later sections derive three models in which a positive wage-profit correlation
is to be expected; two of these models do not have non-competitive or rent-sharing features. The
paper attempts to discuss the kind of wage-pmfit correlations that could be used to throw light on
the usefulness of the cooipetive model.
Section 2 studies the interactions between wages and profits in three different models.
Section 3 contains the empirical results: it estimates US manufacturing earnings equations. Section
4 summarizes the paper's conclusions, and the Appendix describes the data.
2, Models of the Wage-Profit Correlation
The textbook model of a competitive labor market implies that finns are wage-takers whose
profitability will not affect the wage that they offer to homogeneous employees. This is the
assumption of an infinitely elastic supply of labor.
By contrast, the paper proves the following analytical results.
1. In a competitive model, given an upward-sloping labor supply curve, there is a positive short-
run correlation between wages and profits. There may also be a positive correlation between
l An exception is the new paper by Steve Allen (1992), which we saw after this project had been
largely completed. He finds that price-cost margins come in negative in a log wage equation.
However, he does not look explicitly at the role of total profits or profits per worker. An
interesting and relatively neglected paper that is close to being a further exception is Sparks and
Wilton (1971), which finds profit effects in a form of micro Phillips curve,3
wages and profit per employee: a sufficient condition for this is that the elasticity of labor demand
be less than unity. There is no long-nm relation between wages and profit variables.
2. In a labor contract model (with symmetric information) in which both workers and the r are
risk-averse, profits and wages are positively correlated. The elasticity of wages with respect to
profits equals the ratio of the parties' relative risk-aversion parameters.
3. In a bargaining model with rent-sharing, there is a positive partial correlation between wages
and profit per employee, and a negative partial correlation between wages and unemployment.
These are long-run correlations in the sense thaL they exist in steady-state equilibrium.
The theoretical results establish that evidence of co-movement between pay and profitability
is not, in itself, proof of the existence of rent-sharing. The remainder of this section sets out the
proofs of the propositions stated above. Three models of wage determination are considered. The
first is a bargaining framework in which rents are divided between the finn and its employees; the
second is a competitive model in which the short run industry supply curve of labor slopes up; the
third is an optimal labor contract model under which risk-sharing occurs,
Three Models
Consider a bargaining model in which rents exist and are divided between workers and the
employer. Assume that wages are determined as if by a Nash problem in which 4isthe
bargaining power of employees. Write this maximization problem as
Maximise ,log{[u(w)—u()n}+(l—4t)logt
where u(w) is the worker's utility from wage w, W is the wage available from temporary work in
the event of a breakdown in bargaining. n is employmentb and itisprofits. This formulation relies
on the assumption that in the event of bargaining delay the firm earns zero profit and the worker
wage W, and by the choice of units the variable n is also the probability of employment. Define
profits as f(n)-wn, where f is a concave revenue function. The maximization's solution must be
such that each side earn at least what is available as an outside option.
At an interior optimum, the foilowing first order conditions hold;w:''1(L—!—=O (2)
{u(w)— u(w)Jnt
it (l)V(n)!I=0 (3)
Rewrite the first of these as
u(w) —uE)=1—t-1! (4)
u'(w)l—i)n
This can be simplifiedusingthe first-order Taylor approximation
ur) u(w)+ (;—w)u'(w) (5)
Combining(4) and (5):
w+ (6)
This equation shows that, to a ru-sc-order approximation, the equilibrium wage is determined by the
outside wage available in the event of a temporary dispute in bargaining, the relative bargaining
strength of the two sides, and the level of profit-per-employee.
Equation (6) is more general than might at first be apparent Because it stems only from the
first of the two first-order conditions, equation (6) is true independently of the nature of the
employment function. In particular, it does not depend on whether employment is fixed along a
labor demand curve or an efficient-bargaining locus.
A conventional assumption about the underlying determinants of W, the outside temporary
wage, is that it can be described by the function c(w0, b, U), where w0 is the going wage in other
sectors of the economy, b is she level of income when unemployed, and U is the unemployment
rate among workers of the type employed by the flrnt A natural interpretation of the algebra is
that W is expected income and U determines the probability of receiving b rather than wt. Written
in fall, therefore,5
(7)
In a regression equation for (7), estimated on longitudinal data, year dummies are likely to capture
wt and b, leaving unemployment U and profit-per-employee st/n as the key explanatory variables.
At the other extreme from a bargaining model lies competitive theory. It is of interest to
examine whether this, too, can imply a positive co-movement of wages and profztability(2).




where employment, n, is chosen to maximize the difference between revenue and labor costs, and
f(n) is a concave production function. js is a demand shock (or output price) variable, and w is the
wage. The function itQ.t,w) is convex and homogenous of degree one in the prices ..t and w. The
later analysis will assume that the function is twice differentiable.
Assume that st(jJ,w) represents the profit of the representative firm within an industry. By
an appropriate choice of units. the long-run equilibrium level of profits can be set as stQ.t,w) =0.
This is the usual convention that profits be written net of some required return to the enu-eprencur
who runs the finn.
In this framework there is a labor demand curve defined by the derivative of the maximum
profit function with respect to wages. Assume that there is also a labor supply function 1(w)
which may be upward-sloping in the short-run but which is horizontal in the long-run. This
captures the competitive notion that, although in the long-run there should be free entry along a
perfectly ela.sdc labor supply curve, in the short-run there may be frictions that cause wages to be
bid up by a demand shock.
Equilibrium in this market is given by the equation
2 This follows the method developed in I-iildreth and Oswald (1992).6
—icUL,w)1(w) (9)
where the function on the left is the demand curve for labor, and the function on the right is the
supply curve of labor. The differential of equation (9) is
—iç_dw— itdii =1'(w)dw (10)
so that the relationship between demand shocks and wages is
=_ML ￿0 (11)
dlil(w)+tç,,
showing that wages rise in a boom.
Because the profit function is homogeneous of degree one, it can be written
(12)
Differentiating this partially with respect to the wage:
(13)
Cancelling terms and re-arranging:
(14)
w
To establish the reduced-form relationship between wages and profits, differentiate
throughout the profit function itQi,w) to give
div dli —nt —+Jt (15) dw 5dw
(16)
jtF(w) pat I'+±.+7ç (17)
w
where equation (11.) and (14) have been used to substitute terms.
The right hand side of equation (17) is non-negative. It is strictly positive if either
supernormal profits are being made (iv>0), or the labor supply curve is strictly increasing. To
check the former, note that, by homogeneity, it >0 implies and is implied by(18)
The latter follows from 1(w) >0. and the fact that sdjs,w) is increasing in the demand shock i and
has a negative cross-partial derivative. Equation (17) shows that wages and profits are positively
correlated.
A natural question to ask is that of whether there is also, within the competitive framework,
a positive correlation between profit-per-employee and the wage. The answer is that there may be
such a relationship.
Profit per employee is given by the ratio of profit to the wage-derivative of the profit






)=ir ÷ir (21) dw W— 'dw
=- 1(w), (22)
which uses equation (11) to cancel terms. Hence, the right hand-side of equation (20) can be
written out in full, substituting from equations (12), (17) and (22), as
41_2E')= __L[E+-tP(w)+ —--r(w) (23) dwi ) W 7t 7V_
=_i_[a.+ —it5l'(w)+jnr) (w)+ wI (w)I (24)
It,, j
Byearlier assumptions of an upward-sloping labor supply curve and non-negative profit
(25)
wf (w) ￿ 0 (26)8
Then a sufficient condition for profit per capita and the wage to be positively correlated is:
—itl'(w)+jxit4l' (w) (27)
It_is It.
Using the definition of the elasticity of labor demand, combined with equation (13), the inequality
in (27) is guaranteed to hold if the labor demand elasticty is below unity. Hence, a sufficient
condition for the term in square brackets in equation (24) to be positive is that the elasticity of labor
demand be less than unity3.
The final model to be cunsidered is a generalization of the Rally (1974) and Azariadis
(1975) optimal contract framework. In this the firm and workers are assumed to reach an implicit
contract in which wages are set to provide efficient 'insurance' against random demand shocks.
3. There is, in fact, a generalization of this resulL
Equation (24), above is
d(ir -l[pir÷2r5.r(w)P2rr(w)f()
dwt,,ic)T1.w•
Thereare five terms in the square brackets. The sum of the first two is non-negative (equation
(25)). Taking the other three terms, dividing by I' (w) and multiplying by ItwItwp we get
wit_it —it,(it,,—i.tit) (1')
We now examine when this is greater than zero. Using equation (14) to eliminate
(—)w2itit —wlç_n5 —it_It (2')
_(!.flxw,t. ÷)—icit (3')
Recalling, first, that the absolute value of the elasticity of labour demand t, equals ()tww,
second, that the term in the second brackets in (3') equals it (equation (12)), the third, that n =
-itw, (3') becomes.
it
—en(—) + nit5 (4')
11
For this to be greater than zero (dividing through by n) we need,
ltR (5')
ItIt
where R is the firm's revenue. The modified sufficient condition fur a positive correlation between
wages and profits-per-employee, in words, is that the elasticity of labour demand is less than the
ratio of revenues to profits. Note that in the special case of fin) =e, theelasticity of demand is
equal to Rio but in this case the sum of the first two terms in equation (24) is unambiguously
greater than zero (provided a < 1). In this case, d(z'n) /dw =(I/a)(1 -a).9
Although the original articles assumed that firms are risk-neutrai, and thus obtained the result that
wages should be rigid, that assumption can be generalized to allow the firm to be averse to risk.
The model then predicts a positive correlation between pay and profitability.
A labor contact model can be represented as the following maximization problem:
Maximise Jv(it)g4OdR (29)
subject to
J tnu(W) + (1 —n)u(b)],g(ji)d/i￿ ii (30)
itp.f(n)—wn (31)
The solution is a wage function w4t) defined on demand shocks. Implicit in the above formuistion
are the following assumptions. First, the firm's utility depends upon profits and can be
represented by a concave function v(jt). Second, the worker receives utility u(w) when employed
and u(b) when unemployed. Normalizing the sue of the labor pool to unity, the probability of
employment is n and of unemployment 1-n. Assume that there is no private unemployment
insurance and that b is exogenously given (in line with the (iS data reported in Oswald (1986)).
Demand shocks here follow a probability density function g(.t). Firms must offer their employees
the market level of expected utility.
The key first-order conditions are
wQ.t): —v'(g)+?u'(w)0 (32)
nQs): s' (s'c){i.tf (n) —w]+X[u(w)
—u(b)]=0 (33)
where X is a multiplier on the integral constraint (30) and is thus independent of i Equation (32)
defines an implicit function linking profits and wages. Differentiating
4￿t.V'(it) (34)
tinXu (w)10
which is strictiy positive if both parties are suicily risk-averse, is undefined if workers are risk-
neutral, and is zero if firms are risk-neutral. The latter is the well-known case studied by Baily
(1974) and Azariadis (1975).
Assume that workers relative risk-aversion is r and the firm's relative risk-aversion is Q.
Then, combining (32) and (34),
(35) dirwr
In words, the elasticity of wages with respect to profits is equal to the ratio of the firm's relative
risk-aversion to the workers' relative risk-aversion. Here the firm and its employees choose to
share the risk of demand fluctuations, so that wages and profits move together.
To summarize, the extreme competitive model, with instantaneous entry and exit of
workers, implies that finns' wages wiU be unaffected by profit shocks. Intuition suggests that this
result will disappear when frictions are introduced into the competitive framework, and this section
formalizes that intuition. The testable characteristic of a competitive theory therefore becomes the
hypothesis that long-mn wage levels do not respond to profit movements. By contrast, there is a
tong-run relationship between pay and profits in either a rent-sharing model or a labor contract
framework with risk-averse firms.
The remainder of the paper is an attempt to confront these theoretical hypotheses with data
from the United States, Because no suitable matched microeconomic data exist --reporting
information both about employees and their empluyers --itis necessary to splice together
microeconomic data on individuals with industry-level profits data.
3. Results
This paper uses data on approximately 400,0(X)workersin US manufacturing industry.
The data are drawn from the March tapes of the Current Population Survey (CPS). and cover the
years 1964 to l985(). Although micro earnings equations at the level of the individual can be
4. The earnings data are taken from the 1965 to 1986 Current Population Surveys. Individuals are
asked to report their earnings in the previous year. Thus, for example. 1964 earnings are derived11
esumated directly on this sample (see Blanchilower and Oswald, 1992), the focus of interest is the
impact of profitability, and this makes it necessary to take a different approach. To avoid the
aggregation problems identified by Moulton (1986), which result in the standard errors in Lhese
kinds of micro-equations being artificially small, and to exploit the availability of industrial profit
statistics, the data were converted into a panel of cell means. This satisfies Moulton's condition that
the level of aggregation should be the same on both sides of the regression equation. The reported
regressions, therefore, use an unbalanced panel of 19 industries by 22 years4 giving 394
observations in all. Details of the industries covered are outlined in the Appendix. The dependent
variable and all of the independent variables with the exception of the the year dummies are the
calculated year/industry cell means from the underlying UPS data. The industry unemployment and
profit data were merged from external sources and are also described in the Appendix (see also
Sanfey, 1992). In our estimation we use unweighted data(s).
An application of the rent-sharing bargaining model is estimated in Table 1. This is a
version of equation (7), The Table includes a set of individual control variables, These variables,
which are traditionally incorporated in earnings equations, are assumed here to capture
compositional effects of a kind omitted from the theoretical model based on a single kind of
worker. The control variables are all measured as the proportion present in an industry/year cell
and include avenge years of experience (the square was never significant), average number of
years of schooling, percentage female, a set of variables distinguishing marital status and racial
mix, the proportion of individuals employed in the private sector, the proportion part-time, and a
full set of year dummies.
from the 1965 UPS. The use of an unbalanced panel was nccessitatcd because of coding
differences across the years in the industry variables.
5. There is some support in the llterature for such an approach. For example. Dickens (1990)
shows that it is inappropriate to weight because individual en'or terms are likely to be correlated
due to group-specific error components, which means that weighting by say, the square root of
group size is inappropnate.12
Table1 takes as the dependent variable the logarithm of workers' income in each industry
by calendar year calculated from the aggregated CPS March files. Earnings equations forUS
manufacturing industry are estimated from 1964-1985. The dependent variable is entered in
nominal terms; the price level, and other aggregate effects, are effectively subsumed into the year
dummies. The first three columns of the Table are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares; the fourth
is estimated by a one-way fixed-effects model while the fifth column is estimated using a one-way
random effects panel estimator(6) The models estimated are of the general form
y11=p1+xj+Ej, (36)
where E{E1—0andvarfr,] =a.In the fixed effects model p isa separate constant term for
each unit. This model may be written
=a1d,+a2d,-t-, ..+' a,+e1, (37)
(38)
where the as's are industry-specific constants and the di's axe dummy variables which are 1 only
when j=1. In the random effects model (REM) p is an indusb'y specific disturbance. This model
is as follows
(39)
where E[ui] =0,Var[uj] =oj,Cov[4,u11=0.All disturbances have variance
Varkfr÷ujoa+a (40)
butfora given i, the disturbances are correlated,
ConTe+ui,,E,.+uI=p=aIeT1 (41)
The efficient estimator is OLS. The variance components are first estimated with LIMOEP using
the residuals from an OLS regression. Then feasible GLS estimates are computed using the
estimated variances (see Green, 1990, chapter 16 and Hsiao, 1990, chapter 6).
Each of the earnings equations in Table 1 includes explanatory variables for profits per
employee, industry unemployment and lagged earnings. The last of these is a conventional lagged
6 We also estimated using a two-way random effects estimator, but this was always rejected
against both the fixed effects and one-way random effects models.13
dependent variable.Unemploymentis entered at the industry level and as a logarithm. In column
I of Table 1 lagged earnings and profits axe included in an OLS regression along with only a set of
21 year dummies. In column 2 the unemployment rate is added, followed by a series of worker
characterisdcs variablesin column3. Column 4 includes the group fixed effects and column 5 is
the random-effects model. Both Hausman's Chi-square and the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier statistics provide tests between the specifications and favor the random effects model. In
what follows all estimation uses the REM model.
The lagged dependent variable, which is also in log form, falls in size from around 0.8 in
the first two columns to only 0.14 in column 3 and then to below 0.07 in columns 5 and 6. This
suggests that most of the auto-regression often found in wage equations is being picked up here by
the worker characteristics variables plus the industry-specific fixed effects. Because of the
smallness of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in what follows, the long-
run elasticities are only (approximately) one tenth larger than the short-run elasticities. The long-
run unemployment elasUeity, for example, is in absolute value no larger than 0.03, which suggests
that a cereris paribus doubling of an indusnys unemployment rate would be associated with a three
or four per cent drop in earnings. This is a little below the commonly-found elasticity of -0.1.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) contains a summary of recent estimates. The negativity of the
unemployment rate conforms to the prediction of the rent-sharing bargaining model. This effect
appears to be robust across many specifications, If there is any simultaneity bias, it should act to
make the coefficient smaller in absolute terms (that is, closer to a positive value).
Profit per employee is denoted by the symbol it/n. When entered contemporaneously in the
full specifications of columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, profit per employee has a coefficient of 0.0022
with a t-statistic of approximately 2.3, The variable It/n is not entered as a log (because it takes the
occasional negative value). To convert to an elasticity in this semi-log equation, therefore, it is
necessary to multiply by the mean of the independent variable. The mean of it/n over the period is
approximately 10, so this implies that the short-mn profit elasticity of earnings is approximately
0.02, and the long-run elasticity is approximately 0.025.14
Althoughlater Tables discuss variants on these results, Table 1 conveys the main findings
of the paper. As predicted by the rent-sharing model of equation (7), wages are positively
correlated with profitability per employee and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate in
the relevant industry. While this result comes through in an OLS specification without any
controls, such as column 2 of Table 1, the parameter estimates generated in that way appear to be
too large. The favored specification, the random effects model of column 5, has a much smaller
coefficient on lagged wages, and coefficients on unemployment and profits-per-employee that are
less than half those in the OLS specification of column 2.
It is not easy to see how these estimates could be compatible with the competitive labor
market framework. The only possibility appears to be the nne discussed earlier in the paper,
namely, that temporary frictions could induce a short-term positive correlation between profits and
pay. To investigate this issue it is necessary to examine the autoregressive structure of profits
within wage equations.
Colurrms 1, 2, and 3 of Table 2 keep current profit per employee as a regressor, and add
respectively profit per employee lagged one year, two years and three years. These maintain the
random-effects specification. In each case the contemporaneous profit variable is statistically weak
whilst the lagged value is precisely estimated. The sum of the profit coefficients is approximately
0.0035 in each of the equations I and 2 in Table 2. In column 3 it exceeds 0.0045. Columns 4-6
conduct the further experiment of removing the current profit variable, and the results are similar.
The large coefficient on profits three years ago seems to be noteworthy; it is both larger and more
precisely estimated than the more recent profit variables. At the mean, the long-run unemployment
elasticity of profits-per-employee in column 6 is approximately -0.04. In column 7 all three lags
are included, with the first and third positive and significant.
Table 3 keeps the same general form but allows for more complex lagged profit-per-
employee terms. Columns 1 and 2 show profit terms going insignificant-- presumably because of
collinearity --althoughin each case the coefficients continue to sum to approximately 0.003. This
is not, however, the natural or robust specification. Specifications 3-7 reveal the robustness of the15
profiL term three years earlier. There is soot indication that a change in profits (between t-1 and t-
2) enters positively. However, the main result here appears to be that the sum of the profit
coefficients is reliably close to 0.004. Again this implies that, at the mean, a doubling of profit per
employee increases earnings by approximately five per cent. Because of the volatility of the n/n
variable, this is quantitatively important
Total indusn'y profits, it, are used as an independent variable in Table 4. It can be seen that
statistically this is nearly as well-defined as per capita profit (Table 1), and the direction of the
effects is the same. The first three columns of the Table omit personal control variables, and the
final three include them. There is little to choose between the results obtained using the fixed
effects or the random effects model (columns 5 and 6 respectively). As found in Table I,
however, the REM model is preferred statistically on the basis of the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman
teats. Consequently, the REM model is used in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 switches exclusively to a specification with total profits and no unemployment
variable. The thrust of the results is the same as in the earlier tabtes, but some of the details differ.
Lagged profits have consistently small coefficients when entered simultaneously with current
profit. Total profit in the current period has a coefficient of approximately 0.00004 to 0,00005,
and is well-defined. As the mean of industry profit is $500m. approximately, the short-run profit
elasticity of earnings is approximately 0.02. The lagged dependent variable continues to be small,
so the long-run elasticity is only slighter larger than its short-mn value. Table 6 sets out more
complex dynamic forms in a format symmetric to Table 3.
Tables 4-6 correspond to the competitive and labor contract equation given as (17) and
(34). They use total profitability, in other words, rather than profit-per-head as an independent
variable.
Imagine an exogenous rise in demand for the products of industry j.Underthe assumption
of a competitive labor market with frictions, profits it) and wages wJ will at first rise together. The
correlation is induced by the outward shift in the demand curve for labor in industryj. However,
workers of a given skill are then being rewarded more highly in industryj than in other sectors of16
the economy. The resulting inward migration of workers must, by competitive logic, eventually
eliminate the wage gain. A blip in profits therefore, can have no long-mn effect on pay.
This prediction appears to be systematically violated by the data. Of the thirty-nine
estimated equations in Tables l-& only four give any support so the view that profitability variables
have no long run effect, and these four are statistically dominated by the other specifications.
The labor contract model of equations (29)-(35) offers an alternative interpretation of the
data, and one that falls in the gap between competitive theory and the rent-sharing model. Equation
(35) is a steady-state relation, capturing how wages vary in the contract as demand changes, and
thus is immune to the criticism that the Tables reveal long-mn effects from profit shocks. This
model has no supernormal expected returns, so differs from the rent-sharing framework. Potential
disadvantages are that it requires us to believe that individuals are between 20 and 50 times more
risk-averse than firms (to be consistent with profit elasticities of pay of 0.02-0.05) and that it fails
to explain why wages should react to industry unemployment.
One further check was done. It could be that the statistical significance of profitability in the
wage equation stems merely from the existence of rent-sharing in certain high-wageheavily
unionized pans of US manufacturing. Table 7, however, appears to cast doubt on that
interpretation. Is re-estimates the equations of Table I using a sub.sample of industries with low
wages. These are the eight industries --theiridentities are listed below Table 7 --thatpay below
the mean level of earnings in the overall sample. Although this procedure inevitably reduces the
number of observations (n=164), Table 7 continues to show evidence of the influence of profit-
per-employee upon workers' remuneration. The coefficient on the profit variable in Table 7 varies
from 0.0029 with at-statistic of 2.8 to 00112 with at-statistic of 3.47. Unemployment remains
negative but is not well-determined.
Table 7 thus confirms the paper's main finding. Even within a subsample of industries
with low levels of pay, there appears to be evidence of rent-sharing in US wage determination.17
4. Conclusions
The principal finding of this paper is that wage determination in United Stales
manufacturing industry appears to be better explained by a rent-sharing model than by a
competitive framework. Controlling for industry fixed effects, and a range of personal and
compositional variables, the paper shows that changes in workers' remuneration occur, in part, in
response tn earlier movements in profltability(). When firms become more prosperous, workers
eventually receive some of the gains. This is the central prediction of non-competitive theories in
which rents are divided between firms and workers.
The paper considers potential flaws in this kind of empirical test. It shows that wages and
profits may exhibit co-movement in a variety of circumstances:
(i) in a modified competitive model where, because of frictions, labor supply temporarily slopes
upwards;
(ii) in an optimal contract model in which workers and the employer are risk-averse;
(iii) in a bargaining framework in which there are non-competitive rents.
The first of these, however, is not compatible with the existence of a lone-run association between
earnings and profitability. It is this property that is the ultimate reason for the papess rejection of
competitive theory. There is evidence in these data of a long-run or steady-state relationship
between remuneration and industrial profitability, and of fairly long lags on the key profit
variables. These facts suggest that model (iii) fits the data most naturally(S).
The paper also discusses the properties of model (ii) in which there is an optimal implicit
contract between risk-averse employees and a risk-averse employer. Taken literally, the empirical
estimates suggest thaL the ratio of the parties' relative rates of risk-aversion is between 0.02 and
7. There are, of course, other sources of information on a wage-profit correlation, and some
industrial relations researchers are likely to see these results as establishing statistically a
relationship that they have observed many times in actual wage-setting. Btanchflower and Oswald
(1988) documents direct questionnaire evidence of this type. Field experiments like those in
Bazerman (1985) point in the same direction. For a recent survey of explanations for industry
wage differentials, see Oroshen (1991).
.Asthis paper was being completed Jim Malcolmson convinced us that his new paper Macleod
and Malcolmson (1993) may also generate a wage-profit relationship.18
0.05,which implies that US workers are twenty to fifty times as risk-averse as the firms for which
they work. A criticism of this interpretation of the estimated wage equations is that it fails to
explain why the rent-sharing specification (model (iii)) does so well. Nevertheless, the labor
contact model appears to be broadly consistent with the data, out-performs a standard competitive
framework, and seems to deserve attention in future research.19
Table 1.Earnings Equations for US Manuracturing, 19644985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ut -.0716 -.0159 -.0239 -.0306
(3.86) (1.61) (2.79) (2.47)
.0060 .0060 -.0014 .0022 .0022
(6.25) (6.27) (2.40) (2.33) (2.34)
wtl .8217 .7896 .1396 .0654 .0672
(34.71) (31.97) (5.95) (2.73) (2,83)
Yeardummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personalcontols No No Yes Yes Yes
FixedEffee No No No Yes No
Randomeffects No No No No Yes
.9559 .9576 .9905 .9946 .9864
Loglikelihood 132.26 140.052 434.18 545.41 Wa
Autocorreladone(i.t) Wa Wa Wa .3218 .0009
LagrangemultipliertestWa Wa Wa Wa 343.85
Hausmantest Wa Wa Wa Wa Z6916 N 394 394 394 394 394
Source:Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: persona] control variables are averages across industry/year cells and are as follows
1) experience 2) years of schoollng 3) 4 marital status variables 4) two race variables 5)
privatesector variable 6) part-time status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All
unemployment rates U and the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural
logarithms.
T-statisflca in parentheses.20
Table 2.Earnings Equations for US Manufacturing, 1964-1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ut -.0258 -.0269 -.0336 -.0257 -.0322 -.0219 -.0272
(2.11) (3.13) (2.75) (3.06) (2.65) (3.47) (3.25)
(st/n)t -.0012 .0006 .0010- -
(0.73)(0.54)(1.01)
.0042- - .0032- - .0032
(2.61) (3.44) (1.97)
(lt/n)t-z
- .0028- - .0035- -.0035
(2.39) (3.51) (1.51)
(Jt/n)t.i
- - .0036- - .0039 .0049
(3,62) (4.21) (2.97)
.0624 .0594 .0531 .0627 .0592 .0535 .0541
(2.64) (2.50) (2.25)(2,66)(2.49)(2.26) (2.29)
.9862 .9160 .9854 .9162 .9861 .9858 .9855
Autocorrelafion e(i,t) .0009 .0008 .0008 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009
Laange multipilertest348.34334.31339.26345.18333.15337.80338.88
1-lausman rest 2.78382.90633.10502.79822.18982.98873.1069
N 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
Source:Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: all equations include full sets of year dummies (21), plus contola for 1) experience and its
square 2) years of schooling 3) 4 marital stams variables 4) two race variables 5) private tectnr
variable 6) pan-time status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All unemployment rates U and
the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural logarithms.
All variables including the dependent variable axe measured as the mean of slI observations in s
year/industry cell.
T-stadadcs in parentheses.21
Table 3.EarningsEquations for US Manufacturing,1964-1988
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ut -.0213 -.0266 -.0268 -.0289 -.0280 -.0272 -.0273
(3.18) (3.14) (3.16) (3.46) (3,35) (3.25) (3.22)
-13009 - .0015- - - -.0002
(0.53) (1.28) (0.12)
(irln)t-i .0029 .0020 - - .0014 .0032 .0034
(1.27) (1.27) (1.27) (1.97) (1.49)
(irJn)1.2 .0012 .0015-.0015-.0002- -.0035 -.0035
(0.74) (0.89) (0.80) (0.11) (1.51) (1.51)
(1t/nh-3 - - .0047 .0041 .0031 .0049 .0049
(2.81) (2.55) (2.71) (2.97) (2.91)
.0604 .0602 .0532 .0535 .0534 .0540 .0541
(2.54)(2.54)(2.25)(2.26)(2.26)(2.29)(2.29)
R2 .9861 .9860 .9855 .9858 .9855 .9855 .9856
Autocorrelatiun e(i,t) .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009
Laangemuldp1ierteat 334.10 331.97339.50 339.06338.16338.88 340.57
Hausmantest 2.90472.90433,11262.9965 3.09423.1069 3.1054
N 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
Source:Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: all equations include full sets of yeardummies (21). plusconoolsfor1) experience and its
square 2) years of schooling 3) 4 marital status variables 4) two race variables5)private sector
variable6) part-time status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All unemployment rates U and
the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural logarithms.
All variables including the dependent variable are measured as the mean of all observations in a
yesr/lndusoy cell.
T-stadstics in parentheses.22
Table 4.Earnings Equations for US Manufacturing, 1964-1985
(it= grossprofits 1O)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ut - - -.0217 - -.0215 -.0213
(1.57) (2,53) (2.52)
Itt .5670 .5525 .5025 .4623 .4172 .4202
(5.16) (3.12) (2.80) (416) (3.82) (3.93)
.8401 .2619 .2557 .0683 .0645 .0655
(35.83) (7.06) (6.94) (2.88) (2.73) (2.80)
Personalcontrols No No No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Random effects No No No No No Yes
.9545 .9843 .9844 .9946 .9941 .9886
Autocorrelation e(i,t) .0009
Lagrange multiplier test 349.48
Hausrnantest 2.3168
N 394 394 394 394 394 394
Source: Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: all equations also include year dummies (22) plus a constant. All
unemployment rates U and the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural
logarithms.
All variables including the dependent variable are measured as the mean of all
observations in a year/industry cell.
T-stadsdcs in parentheses.23
Table 5.Earnings Equations for US Manufacturing, 1964-1985
(it=grossprofits S3(34)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
.3865 .4952 .4597 .4601- - -
(1.23)(3.50)(4.15)(4.35)
itt-i - .1655- - 3335- -
(1.19) (3.50)
at2 - - .0146- - .3444 -
(0.13) (1.28)
ltt-3 - - - .2325- - .2398
(2.16) (2.18)
.0695 .0674 .0693 .0664 .0685 .0751 .0745
(2.96)(2.86)(2.94)(2.83)(2.88)(3.12)(3.!!)
.9887 .9887 .9887 .9884 .9884 .9873 .9878
Autocorreladon e(i,t) .0009 .0010 .0009 .0009 .0010 .0010 .0010
Lagangemultipliertest 336.06337.61333.46340.64325.84311.13315.59
Hausman test 2.16102.27394.25091.00102.32852.58262.4089
N 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
Source: Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: all equations include full sets of year dummies (21), plus connols for 1) experience and its
square 2) years of schooling 3) 4 marital status variables 4) two race variables 5) private sector
variable 6) part-time status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All unemployment rates U and
the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural logarithms.
All variables including the dependent variable are measured as the mean of all observations in a
year/indusuy ceO.
1-statistics in parentheses.24
Table 6.Earnings Equations for US Manufacturing, 1964-1985
(it =grossprofits* lOg)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
itt .3573 3233 - - - 4145
(165) (4.67) (3.07)
itt.: .2231 .4777 - - .3422 .5253 .2396
(1.33) (3.44) (2.99) (3.76) (1.44)
itt_2 -.0967 -.1559 -.2515 -.0165 - -.3967 -.3760
(0.68) (1.10) (1.68) (0.11) (2.27) (2.18)
'st-a - - .3856.2500 .1384 .3274 .3928
(2.74) (1.76) (1.21) (2.33) (2.10)
.0679 .0691 .0679.0747 .0675 .0680 .0663
(2.88) (2.91) (2.91) (3.11) (2.84) (2.88) (2.84)
.9887.9883 .9885 .9878 .9885 .9885 .9884
Autocorreladone(i.t) .0010 .0010 .0009 .0010.0010 .0009 .3010
Lagrangemultipliersest 333.63322.83340.19316.00329.09329.15340.43
Hausmantest 2.19192.32212.60012.30170.00000.00002.3431
N 394 394 394 394 394 394 39
Source:Current Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: all equations include full sets of year dummies (21), plus conifols for 1) experience and its
square 2) years of schooling 3) 4 marital stams variables 4) two race variables 5) private sector
variable 6) pars-dine status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All unemployment rates U and
thedependentvariable w (annual income) are in natural logarithms.
All variables including the dependent variable are measured as themeanof all observations ina
year/indusnycell.
T-stadadcs in parentheses.25
Table7,EarningsEquationsfor Low Wage Sectors, 1964-1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lit -.0680 -.0271 -.0071 -.0112
(1,78) (1.52) (0.47) (0.75)
(7t/n)t .0103 .0109 .0029 .0112 .0091
(5.00) (5.29) (2.83) (3.47) (3.70)
wtI .5577 .5396 .0184 .0184 .0137
(12.81) (12.15) (0.66) (0.66) (0.52)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Yes No
Random effects No No No No Yes
1t2 .9364 .9378 .9955 .9955 .9864
Loglikelihood 125.87 127.72 215.28 261.35 Wa
Autocorrelation e(i,t) Wa Wa n/a .0684 .0009
Lagrange multipliertestn/a Wa n/a m1a 29.41
Hausman test n/a Wa n/a Wa 8.9378
N 164 164 164 164 164
Source: Cuneot Population Surveys -Marchtapes.
Note: personal control variables are averages across industry/year cells and are as follows
1) experience 2) years of schooling 3) 4 marital status variables 4) two race variables 5)
private sector variable 6) part-time status variable 7) % female and 8) a constant. All
unemployment rates U and the dependent variable w (annual income) are in natural
logarithms.
T-statistics in parentheses.
Low wage sector includes 8 industries with a mean wage for the period 1964-1985 below
the mean level of $9561.50. The mean wage for this group is $7620.50 compared with
$11240.75 for the 'high wage' sector. The 8 industries are as follows, with their avenge
wage in parentheses 1. Lumber and Wood ($7591) 2. Furniture ($7268) 3. Stone1 Gay
and Glass ($9970) 4. Miscellaneous Manufacturing ($8513) 5. Food ($6986) 6. Textile
Mills ($5401) 7. Paper ($9567) 8. Rubber ($6875)26
Apoendix. Description of Profit Variables
The profit variable(Sanfeys variable Proflt3c)isderivedas follows
value added -gymli-realdepreciation -(realinterest rate*reai capital stock) 0'I
For a detailed explanation of how these variables are derived see Sanfey (1992, Appendix 2) and
Gray (1989). Our sample is restricted to individuals employed in manufacturing for the period
1963-1985. Average real profits and per capita real profits for the longer period 1958-1985 are
available at the 4-digit level for each of these years, in 1972 dollars (deflator =CPI), We
aggregated these profit data to the two digit level for each year and them mapped them onto nur
CPS data files. Below we report the average level of profits and the average per capita profits for
the longer period 1958-1985 in constant 1972 dollars.
Profits Profits/head
$million$thousands
SIC2O. Food and Kindred Products 426.04 17.85
S1C22. Textile MIU Products 127.23 5.05
51C23. Apparel and Other Textile Products 164.09 4.38
S1C24. Lumber and Wood Products 186.26 4.91
S1C25. Furniture and Fixtures 176.39 5.75
S1C26. PaperandAlliedProducts 355.47 9.18
S1C27. Printing and Publishing 550.39 7.61
5108. Chemical and Alliedprpducts 719.07 21.91
51C29. Petroleum and Coal Products 892.59 22.95
81C30. Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics 802.18 7.34
5101. LeatherandLeatherProducts 106.25 4.24
Sf02. Stone, Clay and Glass Products 193.62 8.31
S1C33. Primary Metals 312.53 8.76
S1C34. Fabricated Metals 307.35 7.82
51C35. Machinery except Electrical 383.35 8.51
5106. EleetricandElecironieEquipment 357.16 8.81
51071. Motor Vehicles and Equipment 2357.52 9.70
S1C37. Other Transportation Equipment (cxci. 51071) 556.94 6.83
S1C39. Miscellaneous Manufacturing 143.20 7.402'?
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